Month: February 2007

The Republicans welcomed Harry Reid to Senate leadership today, filibustering the Warner-Levin amendment on the surge strategy in Iraq when Reid tried to push it through without allowing alternatives or amendments to come to the floor. The Democrats could not even get a majority to approve cloture, let alone the 60 votes needed, and Reid’s efforts sank into failure — at least for now:

Republicans blocked a full-fledged Senate debate over Iraq on Monday, but Democrats vowed they would eventually find a way to force President Bush to change course in a war that has claimed the lives of more than 3,000 U.S. troops.
“We must heed the results of the November elections and the wishes of the American people,” said Majority Leader Harry Reid. Reid, D-Nev., spoke moments before a vote that sidetracked a nonbinding measure expressing disagreement with Bush’s plan to deploy an additional 21,500 troops to Iraq. The 49-47 vote was 11 short of the 60 needed to go ahead with debate, and left the fate of the measure uncertain.
Senate Republican Leader Mitch McConnell (news, bio, voting record) of Kentucky described the test vote as merely a “bump in the road” that could possibly be overcome within hours. GOP lawmakers “welcome the debate and are happy to have it,” he said, adding they were insisting on equal treatment for an alternative measure expected to draw strong support.

The Republicans insisted that the debate on Iraq include two competing resolutions. The first, the McCain-Lieberman resolution, approves the surge strategy but establishes benchmarks with which to measure its success. The second, proposed by Judd Gregg, takes no position on the surge but instead declares that the Senate does not favor cutting off funding for the efforts in Iraq.
Reid and the Democrats insisted on blocking any consideration of alternatives and demanded an end to debate — which makes Reid’s complaint that the GOP would not allow debate on the issue somewhat mystifying. Cloture is an end to debate on the floor, a limitation to allow a vote on the question before the Senate. The filibuster provides for unlimited debate, which the Republicans appear ready to provide. Dick Durbin accused Republicans of running from the debate, but in truth the Democrats tried to shove Warner-Levin down the GOP’s throat in order to demand that the US run from Iraq. It’s a strange accusation to make that a political party exercises cowardice in not allowing the other to demand retreat — a position that some Democrats clearly want to make.
Not Joe Lieberman, however. In a stirring speech to the Senate tonight, Lieberman made clear his distaste for the efforts to force a non-binding op-ed through the upper chamber:

For the Senate to take up a symbolic vote of no confidence on the eve of a decisive battle is unprecedented, but it is not inconsequential. It is an act which, I fear, will discourage our troops, hearten our enemies, and showcase our disunity. And that is why I will vote against cloture.
If you believe that General Petraeus and his new strategy have a reasonable chance of success in Iraq, then you should resolve to support him and his troops through the difficult days ahead. On the other hand, if you believe that this new strategy is flawed or that our cause is hopeless in Iraq, then you should vote to stop it. Vote to cut off funds. Vote for a binding timeline for American withdrawal. If that is where your convictions lie, then have the courage of your convictions to accept the consequences of your convictions. That would be a resolution.
The non-binding measure before us, by contrast, is an accumulation of ambiguities and inconsistencies. It is at once for the war but also against the war. It pledges its support to the troops in the field but also washes its hands of what they are doing. It approves more troops for Anbar but not for Baghdad.
We cannot have it both ways. We cannot vote full confidence in General Petraeus, but no confidence in his strategy. We cannot say that the troops have our full support, but disavow their mission on the eve of battle. This is what happens when you try to wage war by committee. That is why the Constitution gave that authority to the President as Commander in Chief.

Lieberman joined the GOP in voting against cloture. Unfortunately, two Republicans failed to heed Lieberman’s wisdom and voted to end debate and proceed to a vote on Warner-Levin. One, Susan Collins of Maine, could hardly have come as a surprise. However, Norm Coleman provided the other Republican vote for cloture, a deeply disappointing development for our Senator who has been so stalwart on the war.
Coleman has been open about his opposition to the surge, at least as it pertains to Baghdad, and was widely expected to vote in favor of the Warner-Levin resolution if it reached the floor. However, the bill does not distinguish between the surge in Baghdad and Anbar, opposing as it does the entire “`plan’ to augment our forces by 21,500” (the word plan is offset in scare quotes in the Warner-Levin text); Coleman has gone on record in support of the Anbar surge. On that basis, I would have hoped that Coleman would have demanded a rewording of the text, which then inexplicably demands “vigorous” operations in Baghdad. I would also have expected Coleman to recognize the hypocrisy of the Senate leadership demands for debate while seeking to limit it and to limit the consideration of alternatives.
Instead, Coleman sided with the railroading Reid and the effort to send a vote of no-confidence as our troops begin their mission. It’s highly disappointing, and Coleman needs to explain himself if he expects us to take him seriously on this question in the future. (via NZ Bear)

Bill Ardolino, having completed his embed mission in Iraq with American forces, has begun to write about his experiences at length. His latest essay tells about his experience on a nighttime raid with US Marines and Iraqi Army forces, and presents the difficult routine of these missions:

A fifth stop was another dry hole, but occupants told the Jundi that the house of the man they were looking for was a block away, so the soldiers immediately splashed down a sewage-filled side street on foot, leaving the cordon, the convoy and its crew-served heavy weapons behind. We chased them down the darkened alley, Lt. Kim struggling to communicate with the IA’s about their ad hoc plan of action. The move was poorly planned but ultimately successful, as a blindfolded man was led from the quickly targeted house with no shots fired.
This chaotic initiative highlights one of the strengths and weaknesses of the fledgling Iraqi security forces in Fallujah, particularly the Iraqi Army. Their aggression bordering on recklessness signals problems with command and control: planning, coordinated execution and battlefield communication. The marines think that this proclivity signals a need for more training, as well as results from cultural differences – one American remarked that “when your entire life has been spent fearing death, your concept of planning and self-preservation is a bit different.”
“Insh’allah,” as they say: “if God wills it.”
On the plus side, they’re motivated and brave. Lt. Col. Fisher believes that this is one of the better problems to have, citing the old Marine saying, “it’s better to have to reel them in than have to push them out the door.”

He has plenty of pictures of the efforts in Fallujah as well. Be sure to read the whole post, and drop a few dollars in the tip jar to help him defray the enormous personal expense of his trip.
UPDATE: Chris Muir of Day By Day is also embedding this month; his comic strip will go into a “Best Of” mode for the next few weeks.
Also, I haven’t had a chance to mention it, but please read Scott Johnson’s post about the invocation at the Democratic National Committee meeting last Friday by an imam who called for the end of “oppression and occupation”, the traditional language of Muslims who want an end to Israel. Robert Spencer has more. I’ll try to return to this subject later.

Both Shi’ite and Sunni Iraqi leaders want the US to accelerate the deployment for the new surge strategy in Baghdad. Shi’ites blame the US for not filling the power vacuum quickly enough after the Mahdi Army started to flee the capital, leaving them exposed for the Sunni bombing that killed 135 people this weekend. The Sunnis want the US in place to keep the situation from deteriorating even further:

A growing number of Iraqis blamed the United States on Sunday for creating conditions that led to the worst single suicide bombing in the war, which devastated a Shiite market in Baghdad the day before. They argued that slowness in completing the vaunted new American security plan has made Shiite neighborhoods much more vulnerable to such horrific attacks.
The chorus of critics said the new plan, which the Americans have barely started to execute, has emasculated the Mahdi Army, the Shiite militia that is considered responsible for many attacks on Sunnis, but which many Shiites say had been the only effective deterrent against sectarian reprisal attacks in Baghdad’s Shiite neighborhoods. Even some Iraqi supporters of the plan, such as Hoshyar Zebari, the Iraqi foreign minister who is a Kurd, said delays in implementing it have caused great disappointment.
In advance of the plan, which would flood Baghdad with thousands of new American and Iraqi troops, many Mahdi Army checkpoints were dismantled and its leaders are either in hiding or under arrest. With no immediate influx of new security forces to fill the void, Shiites say, Sunni militants and other anti-Shiite forces have been emboldened to plot the type of attack that obliterated the bustling Sadriya market in central Baghdad on Saturday, killing at least 135 people and wounding more than 300 from a suicide driver’s truck bomb.
“A long time has passed since the plan was announced,” Basim Shareef, a Shiite member of Parliament, said Sunday. “But so far security has only deteriorated.”

That’s not much of an argument, but it does point out the effectiveness of the Mahdi Army in terrorizing the Sunni population in Baghdad. Had the Mahdis wanted to play a constructive role in Iraqi security, they could have allowed Iraqi Army units to take over their positions, along with the American troops already in Baghdad. However, their attacks on both forces over the last year meant that they knew they would be targets themselves, which is one of the reasons they had to flee when the new strategy was announced.
Sunnis, meanwhile, want a dominating outside force to hit the ground in Baghdad to force an end to the war that has broken out between the factions:

Iraq’s Sunni vice-president has urged Washington to speed up the deployment of extra US troops to stop what he called “round the clock” killing.
Tariq Hashimi told the BBC that previous security drives had failed because they had too few combat troops. …
Mr Hashimi, Iraq’s most senior Sunni politician, said if promised troops did not materialise soon, the situation could deteriorate even further.
He was also scathing about the Iraqi government’s own response to the violence, saying it was slow and unprofessional, while he blamed the increase in attacks on Iran, arguing that the recent bombings were so large a government had to be involved.

Both sides of the sectarian divide now believe that the surge strategy not only can work, but is the only one that has a chance of ending the sectarian violence wracking the capital. However, thanks to an extended Senate debate, the movement of those troops may yet be in jeopardy. While the Bush administration has pledged to move forward even in the face of a no-confidence resolution, Congress may yet suspend the funds necessary to carry it out.
These reports demonstrate why the Founding Fathers, in their wisdom, did not create Congress as commander-in-chief of the armed forces, especially during wartime. With the Mahdi Army disappearing from view, the time is ripe to drop an overwhelming force of American and Iraqi forces (especially the latter) into Baghdad to start clearing and holding territory and establishing some trust in the rule of law. The delay only makes that latter task more difficult as it encourages second-tier groups to fill the void left by the Mahdi retreat and the Coalition delay.
Hesitation causes the worst problems in wartime. Once a strategy has been announced, one’s enemies will start adjusting immediately to it, which is one reason why announcing intentions is not a good idea in the first place. However, the political situation here in the US dictated that the Bush administration go public with its plans. Congress needs to get out of the way so that we can implement that strategy before it’s too late for it to have any chance of success. Even both sides of the sectarian divide in Iraq see that much.

The classified portion of the National Intelligence Estimate downplays the effect of al-Qaeda in Iraq, declaring them to be a small minority of the Sunni terrorists. However, four of the sixteen intelligence agencies dissented from this view, including the intel units of the two forces fighting in Iraq. They believe that the Sunni insurgencies have been almost completely co-opted by AQI:

In a division reminiscent of the intelligence debates before the Iraq war, America’s war fighters and satellite imagery experts have issued a formal dissent on one of the National Intelligence Estimate’s most important judgments.
Disputing the view that Al Qaeda plays only a small role in the overall Sunni insurgency in Iraq, four of America’s 16 intelligence agencies have obliged the Directorate of National Intelligence to provide a formal dissent to the 90-page classified Iraq assessment issued last week.
Those agencies include the Treasury Department’s Office of Intelligence and Analysis, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, and the military intelligence bureaus of the Army and Marines.
According to two sources familiar with the addendum, the dissenters argue that the Baathist wing of the umbrella Sunni terrorist group has ceded authority to Abu Ayoub al-Masri, the leader of Al Qaeda in Iraq who replaced Abu Musab al-Zarqawi.
The majority view, endorsed by the CIA, the National Security Agency, the State Department, and others, holds that a majority of the Sunni insurgency is still comprised of Baathists and Sunni nationalists.

The unclassified NIE had only the barest hint of this internal dissent on AQI. The group, which pledges itself to the leadership of Osama bin Laden, only gets two mentions in the nine-page document, but both are prominent highlights of examples of terrorist groups. The first equates AQI with the Mahdi Army in the ability to keep sectarian violence stoked, while the second mentions AQI as primary among Sunni factions in the complex stew that comprises the overall violence.
The dissenters rely on a new assessment of the Mujahideen Shura Council, an umbrella group that at one time had AQI as a component. This group models itself on Hamas in its attempt to provide social services to the Sunnis in Iraq as a means of gaining political power. The Army and Marine Corps, as well as the other two dissenting agencies, believe that the MSC has been taken over completely by AQI, granting al-Qaeda leadership over all Sunni terrorist factions, including the Ba’athist remnants of Saddam’s former regime. Marine Colonel Peter Devlin warned that AQI had won control of the MSC as part of its takeover in Anbar in September 2006, in the testimony that the Washington Post at the time said had told Congress that Anbar was close to being lost.
This is no mere academic exercise. If AQI has taken over control of the Sunni terrorists, then it gives strength to the Bush administration’s argument that Iraq remains a central front in the war against al-Qaeda. If not, that argument has less direct evidence and has to rely on painting Iraq as a central battlefront in the overall war against radical Islamist terrorists of all stripes. That difference is as subtle as the dissent within in the intelligence community, but likely to have a grave impact on American resolve in Iraq.