Another Example Of Iraqi Cooperation

Another of the FMSO documents shows the level of cooperation with UNSCOM weapons inspections that Saddam Hussein provided — and also demonstrates that the Iraqis actively hid something from the UN. Document ISGZ-2004-028947-1 has orders from M6, the Iraqi Intelligence Service’s Directorate of Internal Security. M6 integrated deeply with the Military Industrialization Commission (MIC), the bureau responsible for Saddam’s WMD programs. These orders make clear that MIC leadership needed to purge their records of all material that could aid UNSCOM at discovering … something:

Republic of Iraq
Intelligence Service
Secret, Personal and Urgent (TC: foreign classification)
Letter # M6/1/2/1488
Date 3/23/1997
To: General Managers & Top Officials
Re: Instructions
We noticed during the last inspection of the Agency location by UN team #182, that the team asked about specific acronyms of some of the Agency’s directorates and procedures. Their questions are aimed at determining the
activities of these directorates and finding a connection between their intelligence work and the country’s military industrial activities. In order to avoid the possibility of any discoveries by the upcoming inspection teams, we
find it is necessary to do the following:
1. Go through all the records and files, remove the documents linked to the Atomic Energy Organization and the Military Industrial Commission, or other stations & departments related to restricted weapon programs such
as offers, research, studies, manuals, examinations & invitations to consultants ….. etc.
2. Remove all documents and reports related to tracking the UN inspection teams and UNSCOM, and nterdepartmental memos in that regard.
3. Remove the restricted materials, devices, dual use equipment, documents catalogs, and related books from libraries and technical departments. Ensure clean-up of the laboratories, warehouses and factories from all traces of chemical, biological or radiation that were previously used or stored.
4. The process of removing or destroying the documents, reports and equipment must be done by special committee in accordance with the rules and regulations, and that will obtain the necessary approvals to destroy or move them to a substitute location.
5. Use a standard method of dealing with UN inspection team members. Answers are not permitted other than through the authorized representative. If they question the departments or organizations outside of the agency site, a standard response is to be made to all questions that this is intelligence-related work, and that they have to consult with higher authorities for permission to answer.
6. Directorate 3 is to check all computer work stations, microfilm, computer terminals, discs, and storage retrieval devices to transfer information related to the above subject in coordination with the agency of concern to avoid targeting of these devices in the future.
Put these orders into effect and give our agency feed back within a week from the date issued.
Notes: Return this memo to the agency after the above-mentioned procedures are executed.
Signature of the Director of Directorate 6
3/23/1997

Notice that Khalid Najim ‘Abdallah Sultan Al Tikriti, who ran M6 and personally issued this order, did not instruct his staff to cooperate with the UN. He did not even argue that the UN inspectors would find nothing, even if he ordered them into non-cooperation. Khalid instead gave specific orders to get rid of documents relating to Iraq’s Atomic Energy Organization and the MIC, as well as anything related to other “restricted weapons programs”.
Why? If the programs had nothing to do with the UN Security Council bans, then Iraq would have nothing to hide. However, Khalid understood that Iraq had plenty to hide — and in point 3, he tells us exactly what it is. He instructs his staff to clean up “all traces of chemical, biological, or radiation [sic] that were previously used or stored.”
This makes it quite clear that Iraq continued to pursue its WMD programs, at least through 1997. Khalid’s orders do not contain direction to end those efforts, either, but to hide them better. He thought he could fool the UN weapons inspectors. Khalid had no idea how correct he was.