Saddam And Nukes: Together Again In 2001

Joseph Shahda has translated yet another critical document from the captured Iraqi Intelligence Service files that adds to the increasing knowledge of Saddam Hussein’s efforts to protect and extend his WMD capabilities. Shahda discovered two memos regarding the supposedly moribund Iraqi nuclear program in this file, both of which make specific reference to efforts at restarting the nuclear program in 2001 and later in 2002. Here are the translations of the memos:

Beginning of Page 3 Translation of document CMPC-2004-000167
In the Name of God the Most Merciful The Most Compassionate
The Republic of Iraq
The Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission
To: The Respected Mr. Chairman of the Engineering Department
Subject: Simulation Reactor
An inspection was made to the suggested hall to build the Simulation Reactor and that contain recently laundry equipments (Laundry) and the hall was closed and the location abandoned and neglected for a long time and based on this it requires the following:
1. Remove all the laundry equipments and machines.
2. The structural division should inspect the hall and to repair and remodeling and fortify the building after determining the cost of these works.
3.Transfer the equipments and systems specialized in the control of 14 TAMUZ Reactor from storage 14a to the location of the hall and by phases.
4. Distribute the engineering and technical staff proposed for work in the project to the days of the week where engineer will be dedicated for one day.
5. Dedicate one of the technicians to fully work in the location.
6. Prepare the timeline schedule to finish the project and for the duration of a full year.
Please review and comment
With regards
Signature…
Adnan Salim Girgis
director of the Electronic Support Division
29/1/2001
End of translation of page 3
Beginning of the translation of page 9
In the Name of God the Most Merciful The Most Compassionate
The Republic of Iraq
The Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission
The Engineering Department
Number: 10/2/1000
Date: 1/9/2001
To: The Respected Mr. Chairman of the Comission
Subject: Simulation Reactor
Previously you instructed to re-install the Simulation Reactor. Please approve the delivery of hall that was dedicated for it and currently occupied by the Laundry to the Electronic Support Division with the dedication of 15 millions Dinar for the purpose of starting the work.
Please review and comment… with regards
Signature
Doctor Hisham Mahmood Ahmad
Chairman of the Engineering Department

In addition, a memo dated Septemer 9, 2001 discusses the approval of the Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission to build the reactor simulator described above. Another, later memo in September 2002 asks the IAEC to stop work on the simulator, reminding them that UN resolutions prohibited such work. At the time, the US Congress had just started debate on the Authorization to Use Military Force against Iraq for its transgressions against UN Security Council resolutions and its ongoing efforts to build WMD.
As Shahda points out at Free Republic, the equipment discussed in the memo came from the ruins of Osirak, the nuclear facility built by Saddam in 1982 and destroyed by the Israelis before the reactor could come on line. The mere existence of this equipment violated UN sanctions, and the effort to put it into a simulator shows that the Iraqis had not lost their determination to develop nuclear weapons. Only the credible threat of military force, as requested by George Bush, stopped the Iraqis from completing their project. They had to get rid of the evidence so that Saddam could invite the inspectors to return as a political ploy that would derail US plans for military intervention. It worked, too; the UN decided to accept Saddam’s offer and it snarled the previous consensus for invading Iraq and deposing Saddam Hussein.
The memos demonstrate Saddam’s intent to build nuclear weapons and his insistence on continuing research on their development even while supposedly “contained” by UN sanctions.
Addendum: Another Shahda translation shows the effort Iraq made in procuring aluminum tubes. These memos are less explicit and do not necessarily show that they were intended for nuclear-arms development. However, because of their dual-use capability — both uses involve weaponry and both were banned by the sanctions — it underscores the fact that Iraq was never going to cooperate and fully disarm under the terms required by UN sanctions and resolutions.