Joseph Shahda has translated yet another of the captured Iraqi government documents, and this one shows that Saddam Hussein’s government produced banned nerve gas detectors in 2000. Shahda’s discovery shows that Saddam never intended on stopping his WMD programs nor planned on complying with UN resolutions that supposedly “contained” Saddam (via Power Line):
Beginning of Translation of page 5 of document CMPC-2003-016083
In the Name of God the Most Merciful The Most Compassionate
The Republic of Iraq
The Presidency of the Republic
The Military Industrialization Commission
To: THE PRESIDENTIAL SECRETARIAT
Subject: Detection Equipment
Your top Secret letter number AA’/128 on 10/12/2000, we would like to show the following:
1. On 10/12/2000 a laboratory test was done on the new equipment and the results of the test was similar to the required quality compared with the Russian equipments
2. On the light of the above (1) a second equipment was received from the Ministry of Industry and Minerals and the total tests were done on it on 24/12/2000 using laboratory equipment to Chemical Detection Device (GSU-12) and with the presence of the Chemical Class representatives and the manufacturing party and its success was proven from the perspective of detection and reaction to NERVE AGENTS.
Please review… with regards
Abd AlTwab Abdallah AL Mulah Huwaish
The Minister of Military Industrialization
End of translation of page 5.
Now on page 71 of the document there is a section that mentions that the production of “Nerve Gas Detectors” is PROHIBITED
Beginning of Partial Translation of page 71
Based on what is in the letter of the respected Presidential Secretariat (Top Secret) aa’/4 on 22/1/2001 followed by the Top Secret letter of (M.I.C) 2/4/44 on 13/1/2001 and after review of the technical report the commission recommend the following:
1. Consider it a work that reach level of Invention Works because it replace the need that occur to the Russian equipment that has an expired efficiency and that exist in the storages of the Chemical Class, and it is a PROHIBITED EQUIPMENT where the price of the effective material in it can reach 51,000 Dollars.
Nerve gas detectors normally have a defensive use, as Shahda notes in his introduction. However, the reason the UN banned Iraq from possessing this equipment is for its offensive uses. Units that deploy nerve gas have to ensure that it doesn’t blow back at their own troops. Any army that manufactured, stored, or transported such material would have to deploy these detectors in order to ensure that their own soldiers did not get exposed to the poison. Banning them from Iraq should have kept them from protecting themselves from their own WMD — and his clandestine desire to acquire them is a practical demonstration of his ambitions.
One has to wonder again why the American intelligence agencies that had these documents in their possession for so long never made the effort to investigate them. Perhaps the revelations coming from the work of Joseph Shahda will finally convince them to put more resources to the task.