An Iranian Agent In Phoenix Nuclear Reactor?
American authorities have arrested a Phoenix man on suspicion of violating the trade embargo with Iran -- by supplying the mullahs with details of an American nuclear reactor. Mohammed Alavi stepped off a flight from Iran to LAX and into the arms of FBI agents on April 9th:
A former engineer at the nation's largest nuclear power plant has been charged with taking computer access codes and software to Iran and using it to download details of plant control rooms and reactors, authorities said. ...Mohammad Alavi, who worked at the triple-reactor Palo Verde power plant west of Phoenix, was arrested April 9 at Los Angeles International Airport when he arrived on a flight from Iran, authorities said. ...
He is charged with a single count of violating a trade embargo that prohibits Americans from exporting goods and services to Iran. If convicted, he would face up to 21 months in prison.
According to court records, the software is used only for training plant employees, but allowed users access to details on the Palo Verde control rooms and the plant layout. In October, authorities alleged, the software was used to download training materials from Tehran, using a Palo Verde user identification.
The FBI said there was no evidence to suggest the software access was linked to the Iranian government, which has clashed with the West over attempts to develop its own nuclear program.
This story sounds a little odd. While Teheran would like as much information on nuclear plants as they can get, Phoenix has hardly demonstrated the most reliability of American plants. The kinds of material downloaded do not appear to have a great deal of value for the Iranians. A training manual would assist in operating facilities in a general sense, but the Russians would have to train them on the specifics for the Bushehr plant.
One could consider that layouts and operational specifics of the plant would assist terrorists interested in it for a potential target. The FBI says that this has no connection to any terror investigation, though, and in the event, the Iranians would have been better off leaving Alavi in place. Alavi left that job eight months ago, which means his use in determining the best plan for a terrorist attack would have been significantly diminished. The software that Alavi used doesn't have anything to do with the operation of the reactor either, accoring to the plant's owners.
It does demonstrate that the Iranians are working all angles in attempting to penetrate the nuclear-power industry, if the allegations are true. Someone in Teheran wants that information badly. We need to understand why.
Posted by Ed Morrissey on April 21, 2007 9:49 AM | Comments () | TrackBacks (3)
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